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History of the Magellan Fund
At
the end of our last program, I mentioned the famed Magellan fund,
owned by the Fidelity company. Since we have already started talking
about this fund, why not discuss its history: it is a very
interesting one.
Magellan
was one of Fidelity’s first funds. It was founded in 1963. It
was not particularly large or different from the others, even though
it was initially managed by Edward Johnson 3rd
– son of the Fidelity company founder, and subsequently its
chairman. In 1977, he was replaced by Peter Lynch, who managed
Magellan until 1990 and achieved phenomenal results. Over those
years, the fund averaged gains of about 29 percent a year –
every year. For comparison, the average annual return for the S&P
500 over the same period was 15 percent. Over that time, Magellan
was out-performed by the S&P 500 just twice, while beating the
broader index 11 times, and on average grew almost twice as fast.
When Lynch came to head the fund, it managed $20 million. In 1990,
the fund had $14 billion. Of course, most of this growth came from
an infusion of new investor money, but nonetheless these investors
came because of Lynch’s performance. The fund would continue
to grow into the future and eventually become the largest fund in the
world.
Peter
Lynch had a very particular investment style, which he later
described in his books. One of his main principles was to “invest
money in what you know.” Peter Lynch invested money into those
fields of industry and those companies that he understood well. He
was governed by common sense and intuition: if he liked a certain
product, he might have invested money in that company’s shares.
For example, in the early 1980s, he liked a minivan released by
Chrysler. Chrysler was in bad shape at the time, on the verge of
bankruptcy. Still, Lynch bought Chrysler stock, which ended up
tripling in price. Lynch bought up a huge variety of stocks. At a
certain point, his portfolio comprised shares in more than 1,400
different companies. After leaving Magellan, Lynch liked to joke
that if you remember the symbols of more than 2,000 companies but end
up forgetting your own children’s birthdays, there is something
wrong with you.
In
1990, Lynch left the Magellan managerial post but stayed on at
Fidelity, where he now serves as Vice Chairman. He was replaced as
Magellan manager by Morris Smith, who stayed on the job for two years
before, being a practicing Jew, deciding to leave for Israel. Two
years of Morris Smith’s work were also extremely productive: he
came out ahead of the S&P 500 by nearly eight percent. And the
fund continued to grow: by mid-1992, when Smith left Magellan, its
size had reached $20 billion.
Smith
was replaced by Jeff Vinik, who had previously worked with Peter
Lynch and was highly respected on Wall Street. However, he ended up
being less successful (or talented) than his predecessors. The first
two years went well, and in one of them, Vinik outperformed the S&P
500 by nearly 10 percent. Vinik bought up lots of shares in
technologies companies (something that Peter Lynch almost never did),
and those started growing quickly in the mid-1990s. But by 1995,
Vinik decided that the market had reached a certain peak and was
ready for a correction. In order to avoid a sharp drop in the stock
price of technologies companies, he sold them off and bought bonds in
their place. But it turned out that he guessed wrong, and instead of
falling, the market gained another 17 percent. Magellan, for its
part, lost about three percent. Investors did not like this one bit:
they grew used to the fact that Magellan outperformed the market as a
whole. They started to withdraw money from Magellan and investing in
other funds. Vinik left Magellan shortly thereafter, and was
replaced by Robert Stansky. He worked at Magellan for 10 years.
Stansky had an undistinguished career. The fund regularly
under-performed the S&P 500 throughout these years. As a result,
even though the fund had reached $100 billion in 2000, there were
just $52 billion left in the fund by the end of Stansky’s
career. The fund has been managed by Harry Lange since October 2005.
His leadership has so far failed to produce much better results. In
recent times, Magellan is being accused of practically turning into
an Index Fund, i.e. its portfolio has almost the same assets, along
the same proportions, as an index. And, as its critics charge, if
this is the case, it is not at all clear why investors should pay its
high management fees. Magellan has been closed to new investors
since September 1997, although investors who hold IRA or 401(k)
accounts may continue investing more money into them, which they do.
What
conclusions may we draw from this story? Peter Lynch’s results
cannot be questioned: they are phenomenal. But both Vinik and
Stansky had worked with Lynch and were regarded as some of the best
investment managers on Wall Street. So why were their results so far
removed from those of Lynch? Perhaps Magellan had simply grown too
large? After all, it is hard to even theoretically believe that it
is possible to find enough “good” stocks to affect the
performance of such a gigantic fund. Or were Vinik and Stansky
simply not terribly good managers? On the other hand, it would have
been very interesting to see what Peter Lynch would have accomplished
had he remained in charge of Magellan. What was the role of luck in
his results? How would he have invested money amid the market
collapse of the early 2000s? None of these questions are likely to
shake Peter Lynch’s reputation – his name is now
enshrined in the Wall Street Hall of Fame. Investors, meanwhile, are
trying to find the new Magellan.
With
that, we will draw today’s program to a close. This was Sergey
Zaks. Thank you for your attention and until next time.
©2007 Zaks Investment Advisory Service, LLC. All rights reserved.
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