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Bear Stearns and Other Events: Second Week of March 2008
Last
time, we started talking about India. Although I planned to
continue on with this subject today, I’m afraid that we will
not be able to get to India. Instead, I would like to analyze what
happened on our markets last week, for it was an unusual one indeed.
More things happened in the course of seven days than usually occur
in a month. Last Tuesday, the market went up 3.7 percent: it was
the largest single-day gain since October 2002. It closed up on
Thursday as well, but the market still fell three out of the five
days. As a result, the market closed on Friday, March 15 at
practically the same level as where it stood on Friday, March 7: for
the week, the Dow Jones gained 0.4 percent while the S&P 500
lost nearly the same 0.4 percent – it was as if nothing had
happened at all. But how deceiving those figures are!
As
you know, the market has lost its confidence over the past few
months, seeing risks where none had apparently existed before. This
state of affairs led to a sharp rise in the so-called “risk
premium” and, accordingly, a drop in the price of stocks and
numerous other financial instruments. The financial markets are
structured so that crises eventually resolve themselves – but
this may take a long time to do. In such a situation, the Federal
Reserve is the only institution that may actually help speed up the
process. All of these realities were played out last week.
On
Tuesday, the Federal Reserve announced it was increasing the amount
of credit that banks may borrow directly from the Federal Reserve
(the so-called “credit facility”) to $200 billion. It
did this in yet another attempt to put out the crisis raging on the
credit markets. The Federal Reserve has tried doing this on many
other occasions, but without much success. But this time, the
market reacted positively and soared, as we have said, by 3.7
percent. Every other time the Federal Reserve had made similar
moves in the past, the market would rise and then start settling
back down almost immediately. This time, the market’s
reaction was more lasting. But unfortunately, two other events
broke before the end of the week that put a hamper on the
newly-found confidence. On Thursday, Carlyle Capital, a gigantic
hedge fund that invested in mortgage-backed securities, announced
that it stood on the verge of bankruptcy. Carlyle Capital only
purchased the highest-quality bonds. Its business was built on the
following model: the fund would borrow money to buy bonds using very
low-rate short-term loans, constantly refinancing these loans, while
receiving much larger returns from the purchased bonds. Everything
would have been fine had the prices of mortgage-backed securities
not begun to fall. Accordingly, the fund’s assets started to
go down as well. Subsequently, the banks that lent Carlyle money
started to demand ever greater collateral. At a certain point, the
banks simply stopped financing the fund, and it collapsed. The
market accepted this piece of news with relative calm, but Carlyle’s
story turned out to be a footnote to what happened Friday.
Bear
Stearns, the fifth-largest investment bank that had survived
depressions and wars, recently found itself in a spot of bother.
But no one knew just how much bother it was until Friday, when the
Federal Reserve organized a special line of credit for the bank.
Investment banks are not allowed to borrow directly from the Federal
Reserve, so the role of intermediary was assigned to JP Morgan
Chase: it would borrow money from the Federal Reserve and then
immediately lend it to Bear Stearns. How did investors react to
this news? One might think that the Federal Reserve’s support
would fill them with confidence. Instead, they saw this move as
evidence that Bear Sterns was actually in catastrophically sad
shape. The company’s shares fell by 47 percent. So what
happened to Bear Stearns? As usual, mortgage-backed securities
found themselves to be the culprit. However, even though the
company held more of these than other investment banks, that was not
its main problem. The fact of the matter is that investment bank
trade with each other using all sorts of often incredibly
complicated financial instruments. All financial relations are
founded on two things: trust and collateral. If a certain firm’s
trading partners are starting to have doubts about ever seeing their
purchased assets again – fearing that there is a possibility
that they will not be fully compensated by the collateral or, worse
yet, that the firm itself may soon disappear – then no one is
going to trade with this firm. From the Wall Street firm’s
perspective, there is just no reason to enter into risky
transactions when there are plenty secure counterparties on the
market. That is approximately what happened to Bear Stearns. A
large portion of the firm’s assets were made up of
mortgage-backed securities, which no one currently knows quite how
to appraise or want to take on as collateral. Meanwhile, other
firms did not want to offer Bear Stearns short-term loans, fearing
that these may simply be lost. It seems that even the Federal
Reserve was too late in coming to the rescue: toward the end of
Friday, the market decided that the firm would either be sold off or
announce bankruptcy within the next few days. And that is exactly
how things turned out: on Sunday, we learned that Morgan Chase
purchased Bear Stearns at the price of $2 per share. On Friday
morning, those shares were worth $55. Such a discount promises
nothing good for the market as a whole.
The
story with Bear Stearns reminded me of a similar one that happened
in 1990 to another investment bank. It was called Drexel Burnham
Lambert. In its best years, Drexel, like Bear Stearns, was the
country’s fifth-largest investment bank. Its collapse came in
a flash when it lost Wall Street’s trust. Drexel was famous
because of Michael Milken, who almost single-handedly created a
market for a new class of financial instruments – high yields
(or junk, as are also known) bonds. It is an interesting story and
we might devote a program to it in the future.
There
was one silver lining amid last week’s events: inflation, for
all intents and purposes, is almost non-existent at the moment.
This is positive in many respects, not least of which is that it
allows the Federal Reserve to lower rates without fearing inflation.
One week ago, I said that the market believes that the federal fund
rates will be cut by another 50 basis points. But now, the market
feels that rates may be reduced by 75 points or more.
And with this, we will
have to draw today’s program to a close. This was Sergey
Zaks. Thank you for your attention and until next time.
©2008 Zaks Investment Advisory Service, LLC. All rights reserved.
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