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Arbitrage, Exchange-Traded Notes, and Indian Stock Investments
Today, we will
conclude our review of the Indian economy and financial markets. At
the end of our last program, I mentioned that despite all of its
reforms, India remains one of the most bureaucratic countries in the
world. One of the areas where this is felt quite strongly is the
financial markets. Although foreign capital investments are
allowed, they remain strictly regulated. It is very difficult to
organize a financial company that could buy shares on an Indian
stock exchange on behalf of foreign investors, which, of course, is
precisely how investment funds operate. Moreover, these rules often
change, and these changes directly affect US investors.
One
interesting example of this is the so-called exchange-traded note
(ETN), which was created by Barclays bank to offer investors an
opportunity to participate in Indian markets. Just a few words
about exchange-traded notes: They are very similar to
exchange-traded funds. Most investors buy and sell them on the
stock exchange. Usually, exchange-traded notes, just like
exchange-traded funds, are traded at very near their net asset
value. This happens because arbitrage keeps the market price and
the net asset value largely in line. Arbitrage represents an
opportunity to earn money without any risk. We talked about this
phenomenon in one of our previous programs.
According to exchange-traded note trading rules, investors may buy
and sell them directly through the issuing bank at the note’s
net asset value. This may only be performed in large blocks, which
means that this is done primarily by large financial institutions
rather than individual investors. Here’s how it works: if the
stock exchange prices end up being too high compared to the net
asset value (NAV), companies buy the exchange-traded notes from the
issuing bank at the net asset value and then immediately resell them
on the exchange at the higher price, thus earning a profit without
assuming any risk. If the stock exchange prices are much lower than
NAV, financial companies buy the ETNs and then immediately sell them
to the issuing bank at the net asset value. This mechanism prevents
the price of exchange-traded notes to diverge from the net asset
value.
In
this respect, they differ from closed-end funds. I previously
mentioned that stocks of closed-end funds sometimes trade above
their net asset value (which is called “at a premium), and
sometimes below it (“at a discount”). From an
investor’s standpoint, this is a fairly unpleasant occurrence:
one could buy a fund when it is sold at a premium and lose money
even if the price of the stocks making up the fund remains the same.
This could happen simply if the fund itself is now being traded at
a discount.
But let us get back to
Indian securities. Barclays set up its exchange-traded notes so
that they would correspond to a particular index of Indian
companies. The price of these ETNs was meant to closely track the
index levels.
But
this ETN underwent a metamorphosis. What happened is that in
October 2007, the Indian agency involved in market oversight
(something resembling our Securities and Exchange Commission)
decided to restrict the rules allowing foreign investments in Indian
securities. They did this in order to prevent a further
strengthening of the national currency, the rupee. Implicitly, this
decision also hurt Barclays since the bank was no loner able to
trade Indian stocks. As a result, it was forced to discontinue its
purchases and sales of ETNs at their net asset value in the US.
Arbitrage opportunities vanished and the Indian ETN was instantly
transformed from a genuine exchange-traded note into a closed-end
fund, with all of the ensuing consequences. At first, the notes
began trading at a premium, and quite a hefty one at that: by the
end of 2007, it reached nearly 30 percent. Then, the prices crept
down closer to their net asset value. A few weeks later, they were
already being traded at a five-percent discount. Between January 14
and March 27, 2008, the Indian stock market dropped by 23 percent.
But over the very same span, Indian ETN investors lost 41 percent!
I hope that relatively few people bought their Indian ETNs on
January 14 and sold them two-and-a-half month later. Most emerging
market investors usually purchase stocks for the long term. The
people who bought their Indian ETNs one year ago have earned a
40-percent profit despite the losses witnessed over the past two and
a half months. But in either case, this episode reminds us of the
additional risks inherent to emerging market investments.
At
the end of January 2008, the WisdomTree company took heed from
Barclays’ experience and organized a real exchange-traded
fund. These securities were issued on the back of permission from
Indian authorities for WisdomTree to freely buy and sell Indian
stocks, as need be. So now, investors have an opportunity to
purchase India-linked ETF without fearing premium and discount price
fluctuations.
Regular
closed-end funds are also available to investors: one was created by
Blackstone (IFN), another by Morgan Stanley (IIF). Open-end funds
are also at hand – for example, one from Eaton Vance. And as
always, one may also purchase Indian company ADRs that were issued
on the US exchanges: these include ADRs from Tata Motors, which has
just purchased Jaguar from Ford, along with several large banks,
energy and computer companies.
We
have now concluded our overview of four emerging nation markets that
Goldman Sachs designated into a special group it called BRIC. Next
time, we will try to answer two interesting questions: what are the
odds that these nations’ markets will continue to grow, and
are there other markets out there that Goldman Sachs failed to
mention but which still might be of interest to us. But with this,
we will draw today’s program to a close. This was Sergey
Zaks. Thank you for your attention and until next time.
©2008 Zaks Investment Advisory Service, LLC. All rights reserved.
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